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Abstract:
There are close to seven million people under correctional supervision in 
the United States, both in prison and in the community.  The U.S. 
criminal justice system is widely regarded as an inherently unmerciful 
institution by scholars and policymakers, but also by people who have 
spent time in prison and their family members; it is deeply punitive, 
racist, expansive and damaging in its reach.  In this article, we probe the 
meanings of mercy for the institution of parole.
 
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/icn
Incarceration
For Peer Review
1
 Mercy Towards Decarceration: 
Examining the Legal Constraints on Early Release from Prison
 
Introduction
        The number of people under state supervision in prison in America equals the 
populations of major cities like New York, and dwarfs the population of cities like Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, and Phoenix (Kaeble and Glaze, 2016).  Taken 
as an entire ‘system,’ America incarcerates more people per capita than nearly any 
country in the world (National Research Council, 2014).1 Since the 1980s, the average 
prison terms in the U.S. have only gotten longer, and people serving lengthy sentences 
are growing as a share of the prison population; in 35 American states, for example, at 
least 1 in 10 people have been there for a decade or more (Courtney et al., 2017).  These 
numbers are especially high for those serving time for violent crimes (Courtney et al., 
2017; Sered, 2019); representing more than half of the prison population, the release of 
men and women convicted of these crimes pose a significant challenge for decarceration 
(Sawyer and Wagner, 2020).   
 There are a number of U.S.-based initiatives aimed at cutting the incarceration 
rates in the country, such as the Macarthur Foundation’s Safety and Justice Challenge, 
aimed at reducing jail populations, or the initiative known as ‘cut50,’ lead by the Dream 
Corps, and aimed at reducing the prison population by 50% over 10 years.  However, 
researchers have demonstrated that even if all individuals convicted of drug, public 
1 In determining what the criminal justice system in America suggests about the desires of its citizens, we must concede 
that the United States’ approach to punishment is not actually one that involves a single ‘system’ or grand strategy 
(Mayeux: 2018; Harcourt: 2014). 
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order and property crimes were released early or sentenced to alternatives to 
incarceration, the population would still not be reduced by 50 percent, and they have 
thus focused on more serious crimes in these initiatives (Goldstein, 2015).  Leading 
scholars and policymakers have argued that unless the US federal government and 
states take radical steps to address sentencing for violent crimes and parole policies, the 
country will not reduce its prison size in a way that sufficiently mitigates the harms of 
incarceration on the populace more generally (Sered, 2019, Reitz and Rhine, 2020).  
The global COVID-19 pandemic has brought calls for mass clemency to the 
forefront of national and international debates on incarceration (Abdur-Rahman, 2020, 
Oliva and Notterman, 2020, Grant, 2020). Now is the time to consider the role and 
power of the state to grant people early release from prison as an exercise of mass mercy 
— recognizing that despite their crimes and their actions, early release from prison is 
necessary given our current understanding of the harms produced by over 
incarceration, even if not clearly warranted by a classic justification for punishment. 
While such mass release raises serious questions about the specific mechanisms for 
release, our point here is largely elucidate the way that mercy moves us toward 
decarceration in substantial and meaningful ways.
There is evidence that this kind of recognition is possible. In the face of the global 
pandemic that has resulted from the novel coronavirus, many state legislatures have 
moved towards this position, if not nearly as robustly as necessary. Several U.S. states 
have taken steps to reduce the jail populations, including decreasing bond payments, 
reducing arrests, and state judges have taken advantage of administrative release 
(Prison Policy Initiative, 2020).  And while U.S. states have not released a significant 
Page 2 of 28
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/icn
Incarceration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3
number of people during this global pandemic, state legislatures have created the 
pathway for such action. The states of Louisiana, New Jersey, Michigan, Kentucky, 
Virginia and Oregon amongst others have all taken legislative or executive action to 
decrease the prison population (Prison Policy Initiative, 2020). A state appeals court in 
California has ordered prison officials to half the population of San Quentin State Prison 
after more than 75% of the population contracted COVID-19 and 28 men died (Egelko, 
2020). 
The California court decision raises questions about how such winnowing of the 
prison population might be done. But the answer can be found in the legislative policies 
and executive decisions that have followed COVID-19. For example, legislation in 
Virginia requires the Virginia Department of Corrections to develop and implement the 
Inmate Early Release Plan (Virginia Department of Corrections, 2020). Under the plan, 
a declared emergency authorizes the Director to release prisoners on lower levels of 
supervision or other forms of community corrections, or any prisoner with less than a 
year on his sentence if “the Director determines that (a) any such discharge or 
placement during the declared emergency will assist in maintaining the health, safety, 
and welfare of any prisoner discharged or placed or the prisoners remaining in state 
correctional facilities and (b) any such discharge or placement is compatible with the 
interests of society and public safety” (Virginia Department of Corrections, 2020: 1). 
Noticeably absent in this legislative mandate is any consideration of whether a 
prisoner merits early release. This Early Release Plan, and similar policies, legislate 
mercy in corrections: a release from imprisonment or supervision that is completely 
independent of the meritocratic principles underlying parole and other measures. This 
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moment opens the door for us to take mercy more seriously as a vehicle for 
decarceration.  In this article, we focus on parole as the site where mercy can be used 
toward decarceration in the United States.  As Berk et al (1983) have argued, parole 
reforms have taken on different meanings over time and place; we argue that now is the 
time for parole reform to be rooted in the principle of mercy.
I. Envisioning Mercy through the Eyes of the Incarcerated
In the sections below, we briefly discuss two case studies chronicling the efforts 
of men who have sought an early release from prison.  These cases typify the 
institutional responses to people with violent convictions. People with convictions, 
particularly violent convictions, are arguably viewed as dangerous and morally 
offensive, and thus disqualified from due and proper recognition and consideration as 
moral subjects, which has implication for their treatment as legal subjects (see also 
McNeill, 2018). The case studies selected below represent the beginning of our efforts to 
understand the challenges that exist in the contemporary U.S. justice system described 
above. The studies are intended to highlight the ways that the institution of parole, as 
currently devised in the United States, derails mercy.
Michael,2 who was convicted of murder at the age of 16, was denied parole in New 
York State seven times since he first became eligible, 24 years after he was convicted.  
Although Michael had received a risk score of ‘low’ on a reentry assessment, had 
participated in higher education, engaged in volunteer programming, and remained 
2 This is a pseudonym.  
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incident free,3 he continued to be denied parole for 38 years. Because Michael was not a 
United States citizen, he faced immediate deportation upon release. While he might 
have challenged his deportation, his counsel had made it clear to the parole board that 
this was not his intention. The parole board decisions were in part due to the continued 
pressure by the family of his victim.  
Though seen by staff in the prison as a ‘model’ prisoner, Michael’s attempts at 
gaining release through the parole process were consistently thwarted because of the 
serious nature of his crime. Like many other similarly situated prisoners, the parole 
board relied on the nature of his crime to deny release. But such a decision subverts the 
function of parole. Had the state legislature not wanted people with Michael’s 
convictions to be parole eligible, those crimes would have been precluded from the 
parole process. In a literal sense then, the parole board’s decisions over the span of three 
decades denied Michael his legal agency. More than ensuring that addressing the impact 
of his crimes would be a condition of his release, the board sought to guarantee that 
those crimes would be the block preventing him from obtaining his freedom. And while 
a subsequent parole board decision may lead to his release, that will not erase the effects 
of three decades of imprisonment over the course of Michael’s young adult life.
        Michael’s case exemplifies the confused logics of what has been termed the 
‘punitive turn,’ after the 1970s, when penal philosophies collided with neo-conservative 
and neo-liberal ideologies of control and ‘reform’: not only was he required to engage in 
3 Prisons are governed by a set of rules which regulate conduct.  People who are incarcerated can violate those rules and 
face a series of administrative punishments, from solitary confinement to fines, for the violation of these rules.  These 
rule violations will also be made known to parole boards.
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a required regime of programming in prison, he was subjected to a battery of risk 
assessment instruments, all examples of the ‘risk’ oriented models that emerged in 
response to neoliberal shifts towards the responsibilization of people in prison 
(Wacquant, 2009; O'Malley, 2008).  Yet, his fate largely rested on the voices—and 
power—of the family of his victim (a young, white woman, he is a Black man) – who put 
pressure on the parole board not to release him.  The ascendancy of the role of victims in 
the punitive process represented a shift that reflected existing societal values and 
hierarchies of victimization (rooted in race, class, and gender ideologies), but also which 
intersected with risk logics (O’Malley, 2010; Cox, 2003; Zedner, 1991).  So, even though 
Michael did everything that was expected of him, his freedom was beyond his control; 
his attempts at obtaining parole were systematically denied without the parole board 
needing to make any justification for its claims, his crime became the determining 
feature of his existence, and he was unable to be viewed as a person of dignity and worth 
beyond that crime. 
 Michael was not ‘begging for mercy’ in a way that was untethered from a rational 
quest for justice, one rooted in principles of equity and fairness.  He sought an 
opportunity to be released and continue an ordinary life, one where he could exist 
outside of confinement and allow himself to grow without the burdens and demands of 
incarceration.  Although he expressed deep remorse for his crime, that remorse 
remained unrecognized.  Legal scholar Stephanos Bibas (2004) has argued for the role 
of remorse and humility in the legal process, and has pointed to the ways that these are 
relational and dyadic; yet, in the case of Michael and others, there is no opportunity for 
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reconciliation.  The victim’s family provided their input, and the parole board largely 
followed their desires. 
Author One recalls a call from Michael just after the decision in his penultimate 
parole hearing. Denied again, Michael wanted to know if the Author believed he would 
one day be released. The question was not borne out of imagining that Author had some 
inside information, but out of an honest wondering about whether either could salvage 
meaning from a process anachronistically fixated on his conduct nearly 40 years in the 
past. Michael was ultimately released from prison. Between 2005 and 2015, in Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court 
decided three cases that found that for crimes committed before their eighteenth 
birthday people could not be executed, sentenced to life without parole for non-
homicide offenses, or sentenced to mandatory life without parole sentences. Each of 
these decisions was premised in part on the idea that youth is more than a biological fact 
and might diminish the culpability of a defendant. At the time when Author One worked 
on Michael’s case, the state of New York’s parole statute failed to reflect this 
jurisprudence about age and culpability. Michael’s case challenged this, and he was 
ultimately granted a new parole hearing. While the board did not grant Michael parole 
at this hearing, he was granted parole at the subsequent hearing. Under current systems 
of parole, the person who committed the heinous crime may never able be able to fully 
demonstrate their capacities for rehabilitation -- and the state itself can never prove 
such rehabilitation.  In Michael’s case, it took the state 38 years to decide, in his case, 
under duress, that he merited release.  But this decision was deeply protracted, painful 
for the victim’s family, for Michael, and arguably for the state itself.  
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Charles4 entered custody in 2001 and was ultimately sentenced to 25 years to life 
in prison at the age of 19 for a homicide.  He has spent the last fifteen years bouncing 
between the maximum-security prisons of upstate New York.  Designated as a ‘gang 
leader’ by senior prison officials, he has spent his entire time on a closed supervision 
unit.  This unit is reserved for individuals who are identified as gang members, members 
of the mafia, or high-profile prisoners, because of the nature of their case. Once 
identified as a closed supervision prisoner, it is almost impossible to get off this status.  
Being on this unit has precluded him from participating in the kinds of activities such as 
college programs, leadership groups, HIV/AIDS peer training, and so on, which may 
have demonstrated his worthiness for rehabilitation.  He successfully completed anger 
management programming, however, and he has been able to obtain conjugal visits with 
his wife, whom he married.  He has not been incident free---yet his tickets have been for 
minor insurrections, such as stepping over a painted line or accidentally burning a state 
bench when he and his wife were cooking dinner during their conjugal visit (he was 
sentenced to time in solitary confinement for that accident).  
Charles’s early childhood was marred by neglect: his mother became addicted to 
crack cocaine when he was a young child, and she left him in the care of his father, a 
local drug dealer who was well-known and respected in his community, and who did not 
shield his young son from his lifestyle and transactions.  He also physically abused him, 
and the state finally intervened and placed Charles in foster care when he was a 
teenager.  He had already begun to participate in the family business, and was 
4 Pseudonym used here.  Charles is Author Two’s client in a clemency proceeding in which Author Two is engaged as a 
sentencing mitigation specialist.
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subsequently arrested and charged with drug sales, at the age of 16, in a county in 
upstate New York where harsh justice was the norm: he was sentenced to prison time.  
After he got out, he ascended through the ranks of a local street organization, and 
became known to law enforcement.  He was eventually arrested and charged with the 
murder of another young man.
Under the law, Charles is not eligible for parole for another nine years.  And all 
evidence points to the fact that he will not be granted parole at his first opportunity to 
receive it.  Thus, he is trying to apply for clemency; yet, all sources indicate that he 
cannot be presented as a character who can be redeemed. Law firms which provide 
voluntary clemency assistance will only take individuals under their caseload who, for 
them, demonstrate ‘exemplary’ rehabilitation, which includes an engagement in a broad 
range of rehabilitative programs and active citizenship in facility life.  They have passed 
his case over because he has not had the opportunity to engage in these activities.
But what is Charles’ perspective on mercy?  Individuals like Charles, who have 
spent many years in prison, are not naive about their narrow opportunities for freedom.  
He knows that his status as an identified gang member prohibits him from participating 
in the activities that might make him seemingly more redemptive, but he is also under 
no illusion that the activities in which he is able to participate will even be fully 
recognized as pathways to redemption.  He wants to know and understand the concrete 
and clear paths to his freedom.  
There is not adequate space within the system to recognize Charles’ youthfulness 
when he was first arrested.  There is no place in the parole system to recognize the 
personal journey or pathway he has taken away from the difficulties of his childhood 
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and towards a supportive network of individuals, most especially his wife, who has built 
a home for him, works full time, and is deeply engaged in his personal and spiritual 
growth.  There is no room to recognize that he no longer identifies as a gang member, 
because the system has stamped him in that way; there is no recognition of the myriad 
relationships and mentorships that he has participated in and received support from 
men on the inside who have gone on to become leaders in their community, because 
they are, indeed ‘criminals’ themselves.  For men like Charles, who may not be the 
poster children of an ideal prisoner, is there a chance for freedom?  It is rare.  Yet, they, 
and we might ask, why not?  Charles seeks mercy and grace, but finds he has no clear 
avenues to obtain them, despite the ostensibly clear pathways laid out for him in the 
system.  He was convicted of a crime and sentenced to time; he has done everything he 
can to meet the systemic demands on him for redemption, yet he will likely be denied an 
opportunity to go home at his first parole board meeting.
II. Mercy, the Law and Parole
  To take mercy seriously does not mean that mercy lives outside the law.  In fact, 
there are both mercy-enhancing laws and mercy-depriving laws that already exist in the 
American legal systems.  Mercy-enhancing laws exist at the local level, for example, the 
use of nolle prosequi or the dismissal by prosecutors; and, at the state level, where 
legislative bodies can set a standard of presumptive release from imprisonment.  We are 
invested in the law as a source of possibility rather than simply a mechanism to 
reinforce carceral logics; this grows out of our research and work with people who have 
served very lengthy sentences.  These individuals hook their vision for liberation to the 
reimagination of legal structures which have facilitated their incarceration, in part 
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because they have committed an act of violence and know that they have had to do 
prison time for that act.  We thus believe that an individual’s guilt can be recognized not 
as a source for a lifetime of punishment, but as a wellspring, the start of a conversation 
about mercy.  
We begin with a brief overview of the philosophical and legal conceptions of 
mercy-like practices. Mercy-like practices are characterized here as practices that lead to 
outcomes that would be considered mercy, as we define it, but are not considered to be 
mercy by the actors making those decisions. We then focus on extant appraisals of 
mercy in the philosophical and legal realms, and their relevance and uses for a 
consideration of early release from parole.  
Mercy-like Practices and the Issue of Merit
In the context of existing criminal justice decision-making, mercy is typically 
defined as a form of compassion or leniency that is given to individuals without or 
independent of a legal entitlement, right or claim to such compassion, either because 
they have been sentenced in accordance with the law’s requirements, or the facts of their 
case or crime may not be viewed by the public to merit such compassion or leniency.  
Yet, in a number of places in the criminal justice system context, leniency (or what can 
sometimes be viewed as mercy) is offered as a way of recognizing an individual’s merit 
or their worth, as opposed to being an act of grace that transcends consideration of 
merit.  We identify those sites below, and raise questions about whether they can be 
considered acts of mercy.  
There are various acts that can take place in the criminal justice process, both at 
the pre- and post-conviction stages, that have been considered to be merciful.  Pre-
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conviction acts include the judicial dismissal of charges, a failure to indict by a grand 
jury, the filing of lesser charges or a nolle prosequi by a prosecutor, or a plea bargain for 
an alternative to incarceration. Post-conviction opportunities include judicial leniency at 
sentencing, prosecutorial support of a sentence modification, parole, or clemency. These 
forms of leniency can be exercised by a judge, a grand jury, the prosecutor, parole board, 
or executive (Markel, 2004; Huq, 2015; Barkow, 2008). However, there is debate about 
whether decisions to reduce prison sentences constitute mercy. Might those decisions be 
better characterized as efforts to establish proportionality or parsimony and ultimately 
identify desert in punishment, not to a desire to exercise the restraint that mercy 
demands?  
Thus, some acts might be more appropriately termed leniency rather than mercy.  
Some acts that fall into a grey area between justice and mercy may include those 
exercised by the grand jury, which is legally empowered to refuse to indict a person even 
if there is probable cause; it can substitute non-capital for capital offense, or lower 
charges (Markel, 2004). But, for example, when a grand jury fails to indict because the 
jurors do not believe a conviction will follow, such a decision should not be considered 
mercy. Police and prosecutors can also exercise a form of leniency in that they can 
decide not to charge or prosecute a crime, or to plea bargain, in order to lessen the 
potential effects of punishment. But when the motivation behind those decisions is a 
disbelief in the merit of punishment, given the context, it is not rightly mercy. Nor is 
plea bargaining, in its many vagaries, rightly characterized as a place of mercy. While 
plea bargaining may lead to net-widening and over-criminalization (Husak, 2008), the 
historical use of the prosecutorial power to nolle prosequi, and the more recent adoption 
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of alternatives to incarceration as a vehicle for dismissal of criminal charges reflect the 
potential for plea bargaining to be a staging point for mercy.5 
 The power to exercise leniency is enshrined in the law, but does not necessarily 
require justification by the authority figure who exercises it. Yet, the procedural hurdles 
to clemency and pardons, and the public justifications for granting them, all highlight 
the merit of the receiver. The decisions are not about mercy, but correcting a past wrong 
or recognizing merit.  
Defining Mercy
Enter mercy here. No stranger to the philosopher’s ruminations, the concept of 
mercy has been explored by scholars from a range of disciplines, from the law, to 
philosophy, to theology.  The relationship between mercy and merit has been dealt with 
extensively, for example. Some scholars have rooted the expression of mercy in a deeply 
empathic response to and understanding of human flaws--as an act of charity—a way of 
conveying benevolence or compassion for an individual (Sigler, 2015). And they have 
said that this response can only be driven by a sound appreciation of one’s own flaws (as 
a jurist).  Aristotle and Seneca pointed to the character strengths inherent in beginning 
with an approach to others that assumes that we are all part of a complex web of 
interactions which produce flawed behavior (Nussbaum, 1993: 104). Justice itself can 
actually be rooted in these flaws--and judges who exercise justice can do so in a way that 
equitably appreciates the expression of human flaws through their application of 
5 Moreover, the degree to which plea bargaining serves as a net-widening device should be subject to skepticism. Plea 
bargaining also functions as a means to achieve proportionality.  The legislative practices and policing policy that drive 
the number of persons who enter the system, and therefore become subject to the plea bargaining process, deserve far 
more scrutiny as conduits to net-widening than plea bargaining.
Page 13 of 28
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/icn
Incarceration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14
mitigation and mercy (Nussbaum, 1993: 94).  On philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s 
account, the expression of mercy facilitates justice.
Philosopher Claudia Card argues that “when we temper institutional justice with 
mercy in deciding how to treat the offender, we consider not only facts about his offense 
but also facts about his character and suffering which may not be revealed simply by 
looking at his offense” (1972: 191).  Hers is a claim that people deserve mercy as an act of 
justice. Card centers her concept of mercy around an idea of deserving, based on some 
concept of suffering, she argues that “mercy is deserved on the basis of what one has 
endured and the nature of one’s moral character on the whole, rather on the basis of 
individual performances or omissions” (1972: 198).  She relates mercy, then, to a form of 
compensation or in legal terms: mitigation. But retributivists such as Jeffrie Murphy 
(1988) have argued that mercy should not be ‘deserved.’ Jeffrie Murphy (1988: 4) has 
argued that the exercise of mercy involves both a tempering of justice but also, to some 
extent, a departure from it.  Mercy, Duff (2007) argues, has no place in the criminal 
justice system, as it is a concept that has moral value and meaning in systems outside of 
the justice system, and complicates the aims of achieving fairness in justice. 
Others have argued for a more formal definition of mercy and its uses in the law. 
They have challenged the uses of mercy within a system that, they argue, should be 
focused on desert and proportionality in punishment (Sigler, 2015; Murphy, 1988; Duff, 
2007).  In seeking out a remedy to the messiness of the term ‘mercy,’ some scholars 
have advanced the term ‘equitable discretion.’ They argue that equitable discretion 
creates space for leniency in the criminal justice context in a way that forces the decision 
maker to take account of particulars of the individual’s life and actions that are relevant 
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for the application of justice, in contrast to mercy, Mary Sigler (2015) has argued is 
unbounded and allows for a form of leniency that doesn’t hold the decision maker 
accountable.  Perhaps the strongest adherent of ‘equitable discretion’ instead of ‘mercy’ 
is Dan Markel, whose version of equitable discretion is tied to an individual’s reason for 
committing the crime (2004: 1435-6). Markel argues that mercy should be awarded for 
“justice enhancing reasons,” or those “judgments based on articulable standards of 
desert in relation to culpability and the severity of the offense” (1441).  He argues that 
mercy is “the remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal 
offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are 
morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to engage in 
criminal conduct” (2004: 1436).  For example, on Markel’s account, a judge’s decision to 
sentence an elderly person to a shorter period of incarceration than the statutory 
minimum because the judge feels that the person does not deserve to die in prison, if 
that reason is disconnected from the person’s role in the crime, is a form of mercy, not 
equitable discretion.  He argues that if a decision maker is to consider an individual’s 
social background in sentencing, the elements of that social background must be 
connected to that individual’s role in a crime, not a desire by a judge to be sympathetic 
or compassionate to that individual because of their traumatic past.  In a sense, Markel 
argues for transparency in mercy. 
Markel’s argument raises a core and fundamental question:  is there room for 
truly merciful acts in a justice system?  This is particularly significant in light of where in 
the judicial process the scholarly scraps around proportionality, parsimony, equitable 
discretion, and mercy have taken place. The focus has been on the use of these 
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mechanisms at the front end of the legal process--the point of sentencing; rarely has the 
question of mercy after a sentence has been determined been considered in the scholarly 
literature.  Lacey and Pickard (2015: 673) have argued that once a sentence has been 
handed down, mercy is “otiose,” and the question of forgiveness remains.  We agree that 
‘justice’ is allocated at the point of sentencing is considerably different from how it is 
allocated after one has been convicted.  And in this moment of mass incarceration, what 
happens at the front end, guided and directed by the confluence of legislative 
proscription and prosecutorial and judicial discretion, is hopelessly muddled. American 
punishments have become too harsh; the harsh punishments that pervade American life 
not only have effects on individuals, but they also have population-level effects--on 
public health, social inequality, and the reproduction of racism, classism, and sexism. 
Decarceration, as a principle, is constantly at odds with state and federal laws 
that increasingly proscribe incarceration for more conduct. Mercy should be considered 
a vehicle for decarceration, ensuring that the question of whether someone should be 
incarcerated is not simply a product of revisiting broad laws, harsh sentences, or past 
conduct in the light of more recent efforts at rehabilitation.  
In his recent book on his work as a criminal defense attorney, representing 
individuals accused of serious and violent crimes, young people, and people on death 
row, Bryan Stevenson argues that “mercy is most empowering, liberating, and 
transformative when it is directed at the undeserving.  The people who haven’t earned it, 
who haven’t even sought it, are the most meaningful recipients of our compassion” 
(2014: 314). Stevenson says that our commitment to justice is revealed when we direct 
our compassion towards those who are the most marginalized—this includes the 
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condemned and the incarcerated.  Inherent to Stevenson’s message is that an 
individual’s past conduct should not be a barrier to receiving mercy. Stevenson’s legal 
work draws on the Judeo-Christian notions of mercy as an expression of God’s grace 
and compassion—an unconditional expression, one that recognizes that all people, not 
as particular individuals with particular histories, should be subject to such compassion, 
regardless of their circumstances, or ‘unmerited grace.’ For Stevenson, this is captured 
in his oft-repeated statement that “each of us is more than the worst thing we’ve ever 
done.” (2014: 17-18) But for men and women with the death penalty or life in prison, 
‘mercy’ has functioned to move from a death sentence to a near death sentence by years. 
For example, in Florida, Kenneth Young was sentenced to life without parole for a home 
invasion that he committed with a co-defendant at fifteen-years of age. After the 
Supreme Court found in Graham v. Florida that life without parole sentences offended 
the Eighth Amendment of the constitution, Young appeared before a judge to be 
resentenced. At that point, after seven years of incarceration, most without hope of 
release, he had not received a single institutional charge and had gone about the work of 
rehabilitating himself.  In sentencing him to 40 years in prison, the judge told him that 
he would not give Young credit for the rehabilitation that the Florida Department of 
Corrections required him to participate in.  The sentence was reduced, Young had 
demonstrated some ‘merit’ in receiving a reduction, yet he still faces most of the rest of 
his life in prison.  
This cannot rightly be considered mercy. Instead, it represents the theoretical 
muddling of parsimony, proportionality, and deserts that keeps the prison population 
from decreasing in any meaningful ways. The problem is state and federal sentencing 
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laws do little to impose restraint on the outcomes of guilty verdicts and guilty pleas. In 
such a system, parsimony, proportionality, and desert will always be in tension. In a 
world where the ceiling is routinely dozens, if not hundreds of years in prison, 
understanding when the floor is unjust becomes bogged down in arguments about 
preference and not justice. Discussions of mercy that are untethered from the legitimacy 
questions related to state and federal laws, state and federal sentencing guidelines, and 
immediate or near immediate release from prison miss the point. Or, as William Stuntz 
(2012) puts it, revivification of the role of mercy is necessary in a country that exerts its 
powerful might against those who have been accused of crimes, particularly those 
condemned to severe sentences.6   
III. Parole as an Unmerciful Institution
  The legal scholar Rachel Barkow (2008) argues that the rise of the 
administrative state —which is embodied by institutions like parole boards — has led to 
the demise of merciful practices, in part because effective mechanisms of accountability 
for these administrative institutions do not exist. Ironically, the parole system itself was 
established in part as a measure to relieve prison overcro ding and reduce excessive 
sentencing, as well as to ensure that people obtained the right to rehabilitation (Rotman, 
1986; Messinger et al., 1985).  While there are ways to publicly shame parole agencies 
for the release of people who the public might consider undeserving of an early release, 
the converse approach does not exist. The link between a person’s demonstrated process 
of ‘change’ and successful ability to earn parole is tenuous at best.  
6 It is also arguable that the powerful exert their might (and mercilessness) in other domains of social life, such as 
through the use of military might and domestic and international securitization, and immigration enforcement. 
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Mercy in the context of parole matters because the length of prison sentences 
have grown and opportunities for parole release have been constricted in America since 
the 1970s, particularly for people convicted of violent offenses (King, 2019; Courtney et 
al., 2017).  In 1974, following from national conversations about ‘just deserts’ and 
proportionality, a group of researchers and policymakers came together to propose and 
adopt guidelines for the then-U.S. Board of Parole, which operated in federal cases, 
aimed at making the system more fair and proportionate (Bottomly, 1990).  The 
guidelines imposed a scoring system which sought to strike a balance between offense 
severity and “parole prognosis” (Gottfredson et al., 1975: 37).  The new guidelines also 
required that parole board members provide an individual with the reasoning behind a 
parole denial.  In addition to the federal context, these guidelines were adopted in 
fifteen states (Bottomly, 1990: 345).  According to Bottomly (1990) the guidelines went 
some way towards controlling for disparities and moving towards more fair procedures, 
but they also had several, more potentially harmful consequences.  Four of the original 
fifteen jurisdictions that adopted the guidelines ended up abolishing parole in their 
jurisdictions in the 1970s; the U.S. Parole Commission itself ended, effectively 
abolishing parole for federal prisoners in 1984 with the passage of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Bill, which established the US Sentencing Commission (Bottomly, 1990: 
345).  A number of states followed, and over a quarter of the states had abolished parole 
by the late 1980s, which coincided with an increase in prison sentences across the 
country (Bottomly, 1990: 346).7  
7 For the purposes of this article, we are focused on the experiences of individuals facing parole in several of the 
approximately 38 states that still have parole boards.  In a recent investigation by the Marshall Project, it was found that 
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The reforms to parole have also involved a rise in the use of putatively ‘rational’ 
processes like the use of risk assessment instruments such as the COMPAS tool, which is 
used in a number of states to assess an individual’s eligibility for release, in part based 
on their participation in prison-mandated programs, but also based on risk factors 
related to their individuals features (level of education, for example) and their 
expressions of remorse (in response to set interview questions).  Many people find that 
they complete hours and days of required in-prison coursework in order to demonstrate 
their rehabilitation, only to be denied freedom as a result of their poor performance on a 
risk assessment (see also Shah, 2017).8 COMPAS has been demonstrated to have racially 
disproportionate impacts in terms of its identification of people as being at high risk, 
and thus not eligible for release, and its misalignment of research knowledge and ‘data’ 
(Angwin et al., 2016; Dressel and Farid, 2018).  
On our account, a person who has worked through these traditional frameworks, 
but has failed, should still achieve mercy. What parole boards lack are an ability to 
address this issue and exercise mercy. As a result, in recent years, parole has become 
more and more out of reach for individuals who are incarcerated, according to the Pew 
Charitable Trust (2014).  Individuals who have been convicted of crimes face significant 
barriers to meet the conditions of release from prison, parole, and probation (ACLU, 
2016; Phelps, 2016; Werth, 2017).  In addition to the states that have eliminated parole 
or severely curtailed it, parole boards are notoriously opaque in their decision-making 
at least 26 of those state parole boards have almost unlimited authority over the release of people in prison 
(Schwartztapfel, 2015).
8 In recent years, advocates in the State of New York have pushed the state’s parole board to create regulations that 
would more strongly link the completion of rehabilitation programming to parole release criteria (even though 
‘demonstration of rehabilitation’ is listed as a criteria for release, it is not clear how in fact this is properly demonstrated).  
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structures (Schwartztapfel, 2015; Barkow, 2008). More than one in five people in U.S. 
state prisons maxed out of their prison sentences because of difficulties in obtaining 
parole, with significant increases in the numbers of people maxing out since the 1990s 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).   For far too many people, due process in the parole 
release system is being notified that the parole board has denied your application, 
irrespective of the system’s ostensible commitment to parsimony in punishment. 
Across the United States, the current system of post-conviction relief for 
individuals has well-documented problems of arbitrariness, an unequitable distribution 
of outcomes, and a lack of transparency or oversight, and elusive and unclear standards 
for rehabilitation (Schwartzapfel, 2015; Mehta, 2016). Individuals who appear before 
parole boards in many states find that crime victims play a disproportionate role in 
influencing parole board decisions; that the victim and perpetrator of the crime’s race, 
class and gender impacts disproportionately on their outcomes; and, that their personal 
characteristics, which may have played a role in mitigating their sentencing outcomes 
(ie. their young age upon commission of the crime), do not play a role in whether they 
are granted parole (Huebner and Bynum, 2008; Mehta, 2016; Morgan and Brent, 
2005).  They may engage in every rehabilitation program available to them, per the 
guidelines of the prison system and of the state, but find that the parole board makes 
their decision simply on the basis of their perception of the heinousness of the offense 
(e.g. see the case of Kathy Boudin, whose extensive involvement in prison programming, 
support groups, HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives, and higher education programming 
were tabled in favor of the parole board’s focal consideration—the crime in which she 
participated, which involved the death of a police officer (Associated Press, 2001)).  
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The answer to this dilemma is mercy.  Discretion that does not center on mercy, 
as evidenced by the parole grant rates across the country, easily becomes a way to justify 
continued incarceration.  Yet, because each grant of parole is susceptible to public scorn, 
parole boards have learned to couch their decisions not in mercy, but in what can be 
learned from a COMPAS report.
Not only is the process of being released from prison fraught with obstacles and 
indifference, it includes deep encroachments on personal freedom when one is under 
the supervision of parole or probation offices.  The formerly incarcerated person is 
something of a contemporary trope. People return to their communities from prison and 
frequently struggle to acclimate to a society because of the nature and consequences of 
their status and how that complicates their ability to connect to the key institutions that 
has shaped American life--the prison.  But freedom should not be conditioned on a 
person’s prison experience becoming the albatross around their neck.  State 
governments have the power to decide whether freedom comes after completing a 
prison sentence or being granted an early release because of extraordinary personal 
rehabilitative efforts, or through mercy - the last of which imagines relief as being 
possible without merit.
Conclusion
 Scholars have begun to ask whether we believe that justice requires a 
punishment without end (Loader, 2010). An American commitment to punitiveness, 
degradation, and banishment has played a unique role in the country’s approaches to 
punishment (Whitman, 2003; Beckett and Herbert, 2010). We argue that the exercise of 
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mercy must and should challenge the permanent markers of punishment that affix 
themselves to the individual.  
Mercy has its limits, and that we must interrogate them.  We recognize that post-
release supervision and parole can in and of themselves not be merciful institutions, 
and the use and over-use of parole violations have created a robust funnel back to 
prisons (Jacobi, et al., 2013; Klingele, 2013; Bülow, 2019).  Mercy should not be an act 
that only ever can exist at the early stages of the system, when a person’s crime is linked 
to his or her life, and his or her ability to have a full life should never be treated 
conditionally.  In the case of individuals like Michael and Charles, whose lives will 
continue to be enmeshed with the criminal justice system for many years to come, it 
must be linked to a sense of transparency and fairness, and a recognition of human 
dignity and worth.  
These are particularly salient questions in the context of states that have 
abolished parole, or created punitive sanctions which allow for little or no discretion on 
the part of parole boards.  If there should be a place within the legal structure of the 
liberal democratic context of the United States for its citizens, even those who are 
incarcerated, to demand dignity and rights in the context of those laws (Sigler, 2016), 
where is the place for them to find freedom?  Without vigilance, we risk the 
perpetuation of the idea that only appropriate sinners can live amongst us.  
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